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ABSTRACT 
 
Since 2010, transnational banks such as the Islamic Development Bank, and governments 
including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United States and Burkina Faso have begun to promote 
Islamic education reform programs in Burkina Faso. These institutions agree on the need to 
create a singular national curriculum and increase governmental regulation of Islamic schools. 
The rationales for the necessity of this education reform vary from an emphasis on government 
support for private schools to an assumption that Islamic extremism emerges because of a 
deleterious Islamic education and misteachings of the Quran. This effort to reform Islamic 
schools by standardizing the curriculum and increasing government regulation of the education 
system is based on the assumptions that standardization is possible and Islamic practices and 
beliefs in Burkina Faso are narrowly divided by fundamental extremists against liberal 
moderates. In this paper, I seek to challenge these assumptions by offering a history of the 
Communauté Musulmane de Haute Volta. In 1962, the Communauté became the Upper Volta’s 
first formal Islamic organization. On the occasion of the first General Assembly, the 
Communauté’s leaders declared that Muslims within the newly independent nation were united. 
However, over the succeeding decade, disputes within the organization over religious teachings 
and practices revealed a divergence of views on the ‘correct’ forms of Islam despite a shared 
political interest in safeguarding Islam from the secular state. The Communauté's efforts failed 
because of their struggles to codify Islam in creating a national curriculum. I use this case to 
argue for caution on the part of those who would seek to promote a national Franco-Arab 
education as a forum through which to deliver religious teachings. I suggest that this rational-
technocratic project might learn from the long history of the plural and dynamic nature of Islam 
in Burkina Faso and the fate of the Communauté.  
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Introduction 
Since 2010, the government of Burkina Faso has begun to promote Islamic education 
reform programs in the country, with the purpose of creating a singular national curriculum and 
increasing governmental regulation of Islamic schools. The rationales for this reform vary from 
equity in public subsidization to political control: specifically, an emphasis on government 
support for private schools to an assumption that Islamic extremism emerges because of a 
deleterious Islamic education and misteachings of the Quran. This effort to reform Islamic 
schools by standardizing the curriculum and increasing government regulation of the education 
system assumes that standardization is possible and that Islamic practices and beliefs in Burkina 
Faso are narrowly divided by fundamental extremists against liberal moderates. 
 
Many of these reforms are enacted under a vast program, the “Project d’Appui à 
l’Enseignement Primaire Bilingue Franco-Arabe” (PREFA). PREFA is an $18 million-dollar, 
four-year project funded by the Islamic Development Bank and implemented by the Burkinabe 
government aiming to standardize the nation's Franco-Arab education with a unified curriculum 
and government regulation of these schools. PREFA is the Burkinabe government's first attempt 
to partner with the country's Franco-Arab schools, privately funded institutions that teach the 
national French curriculum as well as Arabic and provide a religious education. However, this is 
not the first effort to unify the country's Islamic schools, as the nation’s first Islamic association, 
the “Communauté Musulmane”, similarly but unsuccessfully attempted to do so fifty years 
before. The question being raised in this research is about the prospects of PREFA against the 
background of earlier reforms: What lessons about the prospects for successful educational 
reform of Islamic schooling can be drawn from the earlier experiences of the Communauté?    
 
In exploring these questions, this paper seeks to add to the critical empirical literature on 
faith-based organizations and educational institutions1 for failing to analyze religion as dynamic 
and changing in relation to national development. Through a case study of the shifting visions for 
Islamic education in Burkina Faso, I demonstrate how religious practices and national 
educational objectives shift in relation to each other and offer insight into the lessons that 
scholars and development practitioners may learn from this sort of critical analysis. I explain that 
Islamic educational reform was a national priority in Burkina Faso prior to the government 
efforts under PREFA. These previous reforms led by the Communauté were never realized for a 
variety of reasons ranging from profound differences in settlement history, resources and 
political objectives, and religious practices that ultimately led to the splintering of the 
Communauté. While the context of Burkina Faso has changed, I propose that from the history of 
the Communauté, PREFA's administrators and proponents are warned of the difficulties in using 
education reform as a forum through which to prescribe religious teachings.  
 
To make this case, I begin with a brief description of current reforms and their logic. I 
follow with a detailed account of the Communauté, the largest and longest-lasting attempt at 
reforming Islamic education in the country. The presentation of this experience is organized to 
highlight the historical background under which it emerged but also some of the key obstacles to 
                                               
1 Séverine Deneulin and Carole Rakodi. “Revisiting Religion: Development Studies Thirty Years On,” World 
Development 39, no. 1 (2011): 45–54.  
Sabrine Alkire, “Religion and development”, in DA Clark (ed), Elgar Companion to Development Studies, 
(Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2006). 508. 
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its success. I conclude with a summary of main impediments to Communauté 's success and 
lessons for the PREFA reforms. Through the case study of the Communauté, I also offer 
suggestions for what improvement programs engaging with faith-based organizations and 
educational infrastructures as well as academic scholars exploring the nexus of religion and 
development may learn from this case study.  
 
General Background  
 Education is fundamental to the improvement of individual and social well-being2 with 
education of the poor expected to alleviate economic inequality and help poor people improve 
their socio-economic status.3 At their core, educational and religious instutions are assumed to 
operate in different spheres; the first is expected to focus instrumentally on imparting skills and 
the opportunity to level the playing field by helping the poor improve their socioeconomic status 
while the latter is about spiritual growth. However, both institutions are in fact multifunctional 
and they have found themselves deeply intertwined throughout history including in Africa's 
recent history. The effects of religion on development in the area of education attracted the 
attention of scholars and development practitioners following the Millennial Development Goals 
'Education for All' initiative which made primary education a universal priority.4 Countries with 
minimal resources, such as Burkina Faso, scrambled to build their capacity in order to offer this 
education and acknowledged the importance of religious educational structures that were 
previously considered informal thus omitted during national censuses. UNESCO, the Islamic 
Development Bank (IsDB), USAID, UNICEF created new models that combine religious 
elements with basic educational skills of reading, writing and math.5  
 
 Once private religious education became significant to national education, international 
development agencies such as the World Bank and private research institutes began funding 
research on Islamic education. This research compared private Islamic and public secular 
education in Sub-Saharan Africa. Arabic was determined to be a stepping stone towards 
achieving universal primary education6 and Quranic schooling was identified as a potential 
barrier to secular schooling.7 Research on Islamic education in Northern Nigeria argues that 
these private schools remain relevant because the state has failed to deliver an education.8 
Subsequent studies explored potential methods to ease the transfer of students from Islamic 
schools to secular schools.9 These studies focused on comparison rather than dynamic 
                                               
2 T. McCowan and E. Unterhalter, editors. Education and International Development: An Introduction (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). 
3 Lloyd Gruber and Kosack, Stephen, "The tertiary tilt: education and inequality in the developing world," World 
Development 54 (2014): 253-272.  
4 Keith Watson and William Ozanne, Education and Religion: Global Pressures, Local Responses (New York: 
Routledge, 2013).  
5 Hamidou Dia and Clothilde Hugon, "Reform States and Arab-Islamic Education in Africa: Heading towards a 
historic compromise?,” Afrique Contemporaine (2016): 257.  
6 Peter Easton, “Education and Koranic Literacy in West Africa,” Indigenous Knowledge (IK) Notes 11(1999). 
7 Pierre André and Jean-Luc Demonsant, Koranic Schools in Senegal: A real barrier to formal education? (Paris: 
Paris School of Economics, 2009). 
8 N.M. Baba, "Islamic Schools, the Ulama and the State in the educational Development of Northern Nigeria," 
Bulletin de l'APAD (2011): 33. 
9 Manos Antoninis, “Tackling the Largest Global Education Challenge? Secular and Religious Education in 
Northern Nigeria,” World Development 59 (2014): 82–92.  
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interaction: they begin with the assumption that a public secular education offer a preferable and 
stable contrast to a religious education, without examining the relationship between the two 
systems, their internal diversity, or the historical change in the dynamics between the two.  
 
Research on Islamic educations would benefit from debates in development studies that 
argue for religion and religious institutions to be understood as dynamic and heterogeneous and 
the need to rethink what development- or education- may mean for religious leaders and 
organizations. Since the 2000s, religion and faith-based organizations have been considered 
useful in the execution of improvement projects because they are assumed to be integrated into 
local communities and best positioned to provide social services, defend human rights and 
manage international aid.10 In the late 1990s, the World Bank generated a ‘faith and 
development' interface11 and the United States government permitted the funding of non-
proselytizing activities of religious organizations following George W Bush's Faith Based 
Initiative. The sudden donor support for social service deliveries by religious organizations was 
combined with a shift in academic definitions of development. Whereas development was 
previously measured by national economic growth, definitions became multidimensional, 
encompassing economic goals while sensitive to culture and religion.12 Academic studies began 
to integrate the possible roles of religion in the distribution of social services.13 This led to 
investigations of the potential roles of faith-based organizations in international development14 
and alternative development models imagined, supported and practiced through one's faith.15  
 
This growing body of religion and development literature was criticized by Ben Jones 
and Marie Juul Petersen for being "instrumental, narrow and normative."16 First, these studies 
assume that religion can be used as a tool in the process of distribution of social services.17 
Second, they narrowly focus on faith-based organizations, which they assume to be embedded in 
all communities of the same faith and able to deliver social services efficiently.18 Finally, 
religion is understood as separate from mainstream development, without exploring how 
                                               
10 Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations (United 
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  
11 See, for instance, Marshall & Marsh, Millennium Challenges for Development and Faith Institutions 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003); Marshall & Keough, Mind, Heart and Soul in the Fight against Poverty 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2004); and Marshall, K and L. Keough, Finding Global Balance: Common Ground 
Between the Worlds of Development and Faith, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005). 
12Jenny Lunn, "The Role of Religion, Spirituality and Faith in Development: a critical theory approach,” Third 
World Quarterly 30, no. 5 (2009): 937-951. 
13 Gerrie ter Harr & Stephen Ellis, "The Role of Religion in Development: Towards a New Relationship between 
the European Union and Africa," The European Journal of Development Research 18, no. 3 (2007): 351-367. 
14 Gerard Clarke, "Agents of transformation? Donors, faith-based organisations and international development", 
Third World Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 77–96. 
15 Wendy Tyndale, "Idealism and practicality: the role of religion in development," Development 46, no. 4 (2003): 
22–28. 
16 Ben Jones & Marie Juul Petersen, "Instrumental, Narrow, Normative? Reviewing recent work on religion and 
development," Third World Quarterly 32, no. 7 (2011): 1291-1306. 
17 Gerrie ter Harr & Stephen Ellis, "The Role of Religion in Development: Towards a New Relationship between 
the European Union and Africa," The European Journal of Development Research 18, no. 3 (2007): 351-367. 
18 Gerald Clarke and M. Jennings (eds) Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the 
Sacred and the Secular, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  
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religious practices are reshaped by improvement projects. Severine Deneulin and Caroline 
Rakodi similarly critiqued the recent literature on religion and development for failing to 
recognize religion as dynamic and heterogeneous.19 Their analysis ends with a suggestion for 
improving this literature by starting not with the assumption that religion can be integrated into 
development, but instead by rethinking what development might mean for different faith groups, 
practices and beliefs. Sabrine Alkire suggested that the best writings on religion and 
development are historical and anthropological, offering a narrative of changing religious 
practices alongside other variables such as the economy and politics.20 Examples of this 
approach include Erica Bornstein’s study of Protestant NGOs in Zimbabwe;21 Occhipinti’s 
analysis of religious NGOs in Argentina22 and Ben Jones’s research on the role that religious 
institutions play in shaping social, political and economic life in rural Uganda.23 These studies 
focus on the everyday practices of religious organizations to offer insight into their goals, 
changing organizational practices and visions of development that are based in both material and 
spiritual progression. 
 
 This paper seeks to contribute to this literature on religion and development by offering a 
case study of the Communauté Musulman's attempts to reform Islamic education in Burkina 
Faso. The focus of the paper on a religious association, not a faith-based organization or 
religious non-profit, draws attention to the role of this under-discussed actor in national 
development and education. Additionally, I focus on shifting Islamic practices and beliefs in 
Burkina Faso, examining how expressions of Islam changed alongside political change and 
progression in secular and Christian education. This paper joins the critique that development 
studies research on religion and faith-based organizations needs to analyze religion as dynamic. I 
build on this literature by arguing that development practioners and scholars may learn lessons 
for improved engagement through employing this critical and historical approach to their project 
plans and research.   
 
Case Study Selection and Methodological Approach 
 The Communauté was selected as a case study for this paper because it was the first 
Islamic association in the Upper Volta and the first national attempt to create and unify Franco-
Arab institutions. My interest in Islamic education originated from my previous experiences 
living, volunteering and working in Dialacouto, a rural village in Eastern Senegal for two years, 
and Koutiala, a district town in Southwestern Mali near the border with Burkina Faso. In Mali I 
lived in the home of a marabout, or religious teacher, for one year and became fascinated by the 
constant stream of individuals who would travel for days to speak to him, learn from him and be 
healed by his incantations. The research I present in this paper is based on empirical data 
collected in the course of fieldwork in Ouagadougou during the summers of 2016 and 2017.  
                                               
19 Séverine Deneulin and Carole Rakodi. “Revisiting Religion: Development Studies Thirty Years On,” World 
Development 39, no. 1 (2011): 45–54. 
20 Sabrine Alkire, ‘Religion and development’, in DA Clark (ed), Elgar Companion to Development Studies, 
(Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2006), 508. 
21 Erica Bornstein, The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
22 Laurie A. Occhipinti, Acting on Faith: Religious Development Organizations in Northwestern Argentina 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). 
23Ben Jones, Beyond the State in Rural Uganda. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2009).  
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While conducting research in Burkina Faso's capital, the four years I had spent in the region 
shaped my daily engagements with development workers, religious leaders and students. My 
local language skills, fluent in Bambara, and cultural acumen facilitated access to documents and 
interviews.  
 
 I conducted more than forty semi-structured qualitative interviews with representatives of 
local and international NGOs, Islamic associations, government offices and PREFA. These 
interviews ranged from one to one and a half hours and were recorded and transcribed. 
Interviews were conducted in French, with greetings and informal discussion often in Bambara. 
Respondents were selected on the basis of snowball sampling, beginning with contacts at 
UNICEF, the United Nations and a local non-profit organization that works with Quranic 
schools, IQRA. These initial interviewees provided me with contacts at other organizations, all 
of whom were willing to be interviewed. Interviews were held at the organization's headquarters 
where I sat with directors, secretaries and project managers, asking about the organization's 
history in Burkina Faso, objectives, funding sources, ongoing activities and collaborations with 
external institutions. A hospital or school was attached to four offices and I was allowed to visit 
the services, observe ongoing activities and ask employees about patrons, daily activities and 
ongoing struggles. I also spent three weeks in the government office that regulates NGOs, 
DSONG, where annual reports and activities are reported and archived. As I read through 
documents and collected data on Islamic NGOs, I talked to government workers about new 
developments in the Burkinabe government's approach to Islamic schooling.  
 
 Archival data on the Communauté was gathered at the National Archives in 
Ouagadougou. Scholarly research on the Communauté and Islamic associations in Burkina Faso 
was collected at the University of Ouagadougou. A current Professor and acclaimed scholar of 
Islam in the region directed my investigation and gave me his published and unpublished papers 
for review. At the University, I became acquainted with numerous members of the University's 
Muslim student association, Association des Elèves et Etudiants Musulmans au Burkina. The 
student association's headquarters were located close to my residence in Ouagadougou and I 
would often visit informally, talking to the association's President, Secretary and other members, 
several of whom lived in the association's mosque that is under construction. These individuals 
accompanied me to interviews with local religious leaders, imams and Quranic teachers. In 
return, I would pay for a lunch of rice and sauce or a cold drink after our meetings. Following 
field work, I implemented an extensive review of existing literature on Islam and Islamic 
associations in the country and region. Finally, online research on national media sites, Islamic 
medias and social media was gathered. I use the data gathered from interviews, archival research 
and contemporary media to offer insight into the ongoing project, PREFA, and to propose that 
improvement projects engaging with religious associations, infrastructures and practices may 
learn from history.  
 
PREFA 
 PREFA is a joint effort between the Burkinabe government and the Islamic Development 
Bank that is aimed at strengthening the government’s contribution to the development of Franco-
Arab schools in twenty-one provinces. Running from 2015 to 2018, PREFA intends to offer an 
inclusive and equitable education in order to achieve the international development goal of 
“Education for All.” PREFA’s primary activities entail improving the quality of the education in 
12 
 
Franco-Arab schools by building new facilities, offering bilingual training for supervisors, and 
creating a standard curriculum and program for teachers with one textbook for use at all schools. 
Finally, a certification diploma will be given to students upon completion of their studies. 
PREFA will allow students to be integrated into French public schools after their Franco-Arab 
education and obtain formal employment without the risk of being marginalized because of their 
minimal French knowledge.  
 
 The reform of Quranic and Franco-Arab education was identified by the International 
Crisis Group as instrumental to fighting extremist ideology that recently spread across the 
nation’s borders. A coup d’état in Mali in 2012 was attributed to extremist groups made up of 
ethnic Tuaregs in the country’s north. These rebels demanded independence, continuing to voice 
discontent over their political status as the Tuareg separatist groups have staged rebellions since 
1990. Kidnappings in Northern Burkina Faso and deadly attacks in the country’s capital targeting 
hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners led the United Nations Security Council and US 
State Department to label Burkina Faso as vulnerable to Islamic extremism.24 International Crisis 
Group published a report in 2016 that attributed the country’s instability to the geographically 
uneven education that is concentrated in the country’s southern regions with fewer government 
school structures in the country’s northern regions. The report states that failure to upgrade the 
education system, particularly in the North, will potentially result in members of the population 
questioning the state’s involvement and investments in their lives and become engaged in 
rebellious activities.   
 
The United States Embassy in Burkina Faso also argued for the need to reform Islamic 
educations in a report on the country’s Quranic schools. A year-long study identified the 
education of Quranic schools to be inadequate because students do not understand Arabic, are 
illiterate and instruction is based on oral memorization of Arabic passages. In addition, the report 
deemed the teachers unfit because less than seven percent of them had formal schooling or were 
literate in French. The report concluded that demand for Islamic schools, both Quranic and 
Franco-Arab, was rapidly growing and needed to be recognized by the government with an 
organized curriculum and teaching program. After this report, the US government financially 
supported a local non-profit organization, IQRA (meaning to read in Arabic), that aims to 
contribute to peace and development in Burkina Faso by promoting activities in Quranic schools. 
IQRA primarily educates Quranic teachers to read and write in local languages using Arabic 
script. 
 
International actors including the Islamic Development Bank and the International Crisis 
Group and foreign governments such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United States and Burkina 
Faso all promote Islamic education reform programs in Burkina Faso. Similar to PREFA, the 
national governments of Senegal, Niger, Mali and Chad are working with international 
organizations including UNESCO, UNICEF and the Islamic Development Bank to bridge the 
gap between public and Franco-Arab education and guarantee an education for all. This is the 
                                               
24 Associated Press. "In Burkina Faso, Living with Risk of Terror is New Reality," VOA News online, June 15, 
2017, http://www.voanews.coma/a/burkina-faso-danger/3901663.html  
Security Council Press Release. "Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso." United Nations, August 14, 2017. Accessed December 15, 2017. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12955.doc.htm  
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first moment that the reform of these Franco- Arab schools has received widespread international 
attention, yet this is not the first attempt to reform these schools in Burkina Faso. This paper 
argues that the history of the Communauté offers insight for PREFA of the difficulties in 
establishing a long lasting educational reform across the country’s dynamic Islamic beliefs and 
practices. 
 
The Communauté Musulmane 
 The Upper Volta's25 first Islamic association, the Communauté Musulmane de Haute 
Volta, was set to represent the unity of all Voltaic Muslims. One of its primary goals was to 
restructure the country's Islamic schools. Prior to independence from France, the only Islamic 
schools in the region were Quranic institutions. These schools are generally described as the 
lowest level of learning in Islamic educations because their pedagogy is based on oral 
memorization of Arabic passages from the Quran with minimal education in the Arabic 
language. The Communauté envisioned the creation of new Franco-Arab schools with a national 
curriculum to be regulated by the Communaute and an education in French, Arabic, and the 
Quran. Within ten years of existence, the Communaute splintered as an organization and a 
unified network of reformed Islamic schools were never created.  
 
However, Franco-Arab schools were independently established by communities and the 
number of Islamic school structures, both Quranic and Franco-Arab schools, continued to grow, 
particularly since the 1980s.26 Franco-Arab schools have differing definitions throughout 
francophone Africa. For the context of Burkina Faso, I define them as bilingual institutions that 
teach both French and Arabic and offer an education that is similar to the state school program in 
addition to an Arabic education and teaching of the Quran. The majority of Franco-Arab schools 
have been built since the 1980s by NGOs, such as Direct Aid, Qatar Charity, and Fatawa 
Islamique el Hairia. These organizations rely on funding from Middle Eastern donors. Almost 
2,400 Quranic and Franco-Arab schools opened since 2000. Currently, sixty-six percent of 
private schools in Burkina Faso are Franco-Arab schools.27 
 
History of Islam in the Voltaic Region  
At the first national Assembly of the Communauté, the division of the association into 
three distinctive religious sects became apparent. These groups were called the Subbanu, 
Tijaniyya and early Sufi converts. The majority of Muslims at independence associated with the 
latter category, blending local traditions with religious practices outlined in the Quran. The 
Subbanu sought to purify Islam in the Upper Volta of these local practices they call unlawful 
such as the consumption of alcohol, the deification or worship of anything or anyone other than 
Allah, and rituals that are not laid out in the Quran. The Tijaniyya believe that there are prophets 
after Muhammed and worship these individuals and their descendants. This along with teaching 
litanies to be repeated twelve times, instead of eleven, are fundamental differences in religious 
practices between the Tijaniyya and the rest of the Communauté. The following section offers a 
history of Islam's formation in the Upper Volta up to the establishment of the Communauté. This 
history demonstrates how multiple sects developed unevenly throughout the country, with the 
                                               
25Prior to 1984, Burkina Faso was called the Upper Volta 
26Holger Weiss, Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa, (Stockholm: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002). 
27“PREFA,” Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de l’Alphabétisation online. Last modified August 27, 2015. 
http://www.mena.gov.bf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=396&Itemid=1073# 
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first converts to Sufi Islam in the Southwest since 1200 A.D and the Tijaniyya concentrated in 
the North, gathering a following during French colonial rule. The Subbanu emerged last in urban 
areas, appealing to the elite Mossi (the nation's ethic majority) in the 1950s. This history 
demonstrates the dynamism of Islam in the region that persists today.  
 
The first Muslim converts in the Volta Basin were concentrated in the South-Western 
region of present day Burkina Faso and were members of the Mande-Dyula ethnic group. The 
Dyula were (and are today) known throughout West Africa as regional traders. During 1200 
A.D., Dyula traveled from North Africa to forested, gold and kola rich communities south of the 
Sahelian desert into present day Cote d’Ivoire.28 Bobo-Dioullasso became home to the first 
Muslim community in the Volta basin because of its position as a major trade center along the 
50-day journey from Djenne in Northern Mali to southern communities.29 Welcomed by the local 
Senufo population, the Dyula married into local communities, built a mosque and Quranic 
schools.30 Local ethnic groups, the Fulbe, Gourma and Senefou, gradually converted to Islam as 
the economic influence of the Dyula spread and they built permanent settlements throughout the 
region. This group of Muslims are termed ‘early converts’ and are considered to practice a 
flexible version of Islam that mixes animist practices along with Sufi Islam.31  
 
Religious sects that emerged in the early 1900s differentiated themselves from these early 
converts who they argued practice a less pure version of Islam because of their continued use of 
animist rituals along with Islamic practices and because they drink alcohol and consume pork, 
activities that are listed as haram or illegal in the Quran. Most of the country’s ethnic majority, 
the Mossi, did not convert to Islam until the 20th century and had different beliefs about the 
practice of Islam. The Mossi Kingdom functioned as a unified network of kingdoms and 
encompassed the majority of the population and territory of what became the Upper Volta. Mossi 
leaders were initially resistant to engagement with Islam and Muslim Dyula traders whom they 
feared to be political rivals, refusing to allow them settlements within the Mossi kingdom until 
1650 in Ouagadougou.32 Hoping that a Dyula settlement would facilitate their engagement in the 
gold trade, the Mossi leaders allowed for the construction of the first mosque next to what 
continues to be the capital’s main market. Trade opportunities as well as the ability of Muslim 
religious leaders, or Imams, to read and write using Arabic script instigated their acceptance into 
the Mossi court where they served as advisors to the kingdom. Between the 1600s and early 
1900s, an increased number of the royal court and prominent traders converted to Islam,33 
reciting Quranic verses while continuing animist practices. However, Mossi subjects outside of 
the elite rarely converted to Islam. The different historical moments in which the range of ethnic 
groups and social classes converted to Islam shape the plurality of Islam in Burkina Faso today.  
 
                                               
28Peter B Clarke, West Africa and Islam: A study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century. 
(London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd, 1982), 58. 
29Ibid. 
30J. Spencer Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962),143. 
31Nehemia Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs in West Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).  
32 Peter B Clarke, West Africa and Islam: A study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century, 
(London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd, 1982), 93. 
33 Ousman Murzik Kobo, Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reforms, (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), 59. 
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By 1900, less than 1 percent of the 400,000-person population of Upper Volta practiced 
Islam.34 The religious beliefs and practices of Voltaic citizens who converted to Islam during 
colonial rule were shaped by the political context during which they became Muslim. French 
colonists traveled from Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF) headquarters in Dakar to the Upper 
Volta, composing reports on the status of Islam in the region. These reports were based on 
preconceived notions of an Islamic identity and culture after interactions with Muslims in 
Senegal. In 1892 Lieutenant Monnier reported that Islam was a religion of ‘convenience’ in the 
Upper Volta because self-identified Muslims continued to drink local alcohol and perform 
animistic rituals.35 The Lieutenant-General for Muslim Affairs in Dakar from 1912-1921, Paul 
Marty, visited the Upper Volta during his term. He wrote reports that confirmed and continued 
prior generalizations of Islam in the region made by Governor General William Ponty. His report 
stated that “indigenous pre-Islamic customs and traditions were a more powerful influence than 
the doctrines contained in the Qur’an.”36 This understanding that being a Muslim necessitates a 
strict rejection of pre-Islamic customs such as animistic rituals became a central belief of later 
Mossi Muslim converts who were educated by the colonial state.  
 
Islamic practices and beliefs emerged unevenly across the regional and ethnic geography 
of the Upper Volta. In Northern Upper Volta, a sect of Islam that followed religious practices 
different from the early converts in the Southwest was forming, following the Tijaniyya order. 
Originally founded in North Africa by Sheikh Ahmad Tijani (1735-1815), Tijaniyya Islam 
spread rapidly and reached West Africa in the mid-nineteenth century.37 Tijaniyya Islam is 
commonly distinguished from other forms of Islam by the annual celebration of Prophet 
Muhammad’s birth, daily routines of spiritual litanies performed individually and in groups, 
particular chanting at social events and the worship of an intermediary spiritual mentor. The 
Hamawiyya branch of the Tijaniyya order reached northern Upper Volta from the Segu region of 
Northern Mali in the 1920s. By the 1950s, the Hamawiyya had three main leaders and emerged 
as a dominant Muslim sect throughout the AOF. In the Upper Volta, Tijaniyya Islam was 
concentrated in the north and amongst the Mossi, Fulbe and Tuareg ethnic groups.38 The 
following of a single leader whose spiritual elevation is hierarchically structured based on their 
level of religious knowledge is fundamental to Tijaniyya brotherhoods. This practice became a 
major point of contention amongst the Voltaic Muslims in the Communauté as some members 
claimed that Muhammad was the last Muslim prophet and therefore the worshiping of other 
leaders should not be endorsed. 
 
Simultaneous to these developments in the north, preachers aligning with the Subbanu 
Movement arrived in the Upper Volta from Bamako, Mali. This group criticized the practices of 
Tijaniyya Islam and Voltaic Sufi Muslim’s practice mixing animist and Islamic practices. The 
Subbanu movement was started in West Africa by a group of Malian students who obtained a 
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religious education at al-Azhar University in Cairo. They declared that the worshiping of specific 
Muslim holy men and the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammed’s birthday were heretical 
because they were introduced into Islam after the death of the Prophet. The Subbanu movement 
was led by Al- Hajj Kabine and Al-Hajj Muhammad Fode and emphasized a need to provide an 
Islamic education that explained the Sunna and excerpts of the Hadith in local languages to 
Muslims who were illiterate in Arabic. The emphasis for a literate and comprehensive education 
of the Quran was based on the assumption that reading the Quran would illuminate awareness of 
incorrect religious practices. These explanations appealed to a group of French-educated and 
employed scholars, teachers, jurists and functionaries who were interested in direct translations 
of the Quran into French.39 Local Muslim leaders labeled the Subbanu movement as foreign 
because of its introduction by non-native Voltaics and were angered by the movement’s 
objection to their local Islamic practices. Bobo-Dioulasso became a center for the Subbanu 
movement as merchant leaders of the movement settled in the city that remained a key location 
for the Dyula trading network. These merchants prospered financially, gaining respect amongst 
local traders and a growing group of spiritual followers.  
 
 Throughout the 1950s, Islamic beliefs and practices in the Upper Volta were rapidly 
shifting alongside rising demands for independence and requests for an education that would 
allow for formal employment opportunities and financial improvements. The history of the 
evolution of Islamic practices detailed above demonstrates how Islam in the Upper Volta was 
defined by a plurality of religious expression. Upon independence from France in 1960 only 27.5 
percent of the Voltaic population identified as Muslim.40 However, religious practices 
throughout the Upper Volta varied dramatically, with Tijaniyya followers in the North, Malian 
Subbanu reformers gaining a following in Bobo and older, non-Dyula converts concentrated 
throughout the South whose piety was defined by their mixing of traditional and Islamic 
practices. The aim of the Communauté was to unite Muslim communities and to form a way to 
communicate as a bloc to the new secular administration that was largely dominated by Catholic 
educated Voltaics. The high representation of Catholics in government was because Catholic 
missionaries built the country’s first schools, educating a small number of Voltaic citizens. 
Voltaics educated at Catholic schools were the first colonial subjects to be literate in French, 
therefore they occupied the majority of colonial government positions and formed an elite group.  
 
 The desire from Voltaic Muslims to guarantee religious freedom and ensure that their 
religious interests were not compromised by the state was a primary motivator in their objective 
to unify by establishing the Communauté. This interest was combined with Voltaic Muslims’ 
aspiration to build schools that would facilitate their entrance into government positions. While 
these concerns were shared by members of the Muslim community, the religious beliefs and 
practices of the Voltaic Muslims varied. As the early Sufi converts, Tijaniyya, and Subbanu 
gathered to pursue these political goals, conflicts arose within the association over the 
Communauté's leadership and the content and form of an Islamic educational curriculum. This 
history offers insight into the difficulty of establishing a national Franco-Arab education 
acceptable to all. The following section explains the status of Franco-Arab schools in the Upper 
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Volta at the time of independence to explore the reasons for the Communauté’s promotion of 
Islamic educational reform and the conflicts over this reform that followed. 
 
The building of Islamic educations 
The French colonial state established the first madrasas in West Africa which were 
different from Quranic schools in the Voltaic region. Madrasas were first built in neighboring 
Mali and Senegal. An administrative report published in 1921 described the oldest madrasa as 
follows: “the madrasas are Muslim educational establishments designed, in principal, to divert to 
the profit of French policy the influence that the marabouts exercise over the Muslim 
populations. The madrasas are meant to dissipate the pretensions of the Muslim world against 
our civilization. To this effect, they train interpreters, secretaries for the Muslim course, etc… 
and they developed advanced Quranic studies while giving the students a proper view of the 
civilizing role of France”.41 In the first half of the 19th century, madrasas were the only 
institutions to offer a formal French and Arabic education in West Africa. Madrasas were built in 
Senegal, Mali and Mauritania with none in the Upper Volta. These schools were distrusted by 
some Muslim communities because of the French intervention in their schooling. The Upper 
Volta had the second lowest number of public schools in the colonies. These schools were only 
located in four cities in the South. Therefore, very few Voltaic Muslims were able to attain a 
French education, and schooling with both a French and Islamic education did not exist. 
 
 Before the 1950s, Islamic education in the Upper Volta was provided by Quranic 
schools. These schools taught memorization of Quranic verses in Arabic without a translation of 
these passages into local languages. Therefore, the majority of the Voltaic Muslim population 
memorized Arabic passages but were unable to translate their meaning into local languages. 
Funding for these schools was gathered by community members and was unstable. The schools 
were housed in simple, non-permanent structures without chairs or tables. A French political 
report published in 1952 documented over 300 Quranic schools throughout the country, with 
some having as few as five students. These schools were required to be registered with the 
government, a policy that was carried over to the post-colonial government. However, the effect 
of this policy was less clear: “Most teacher marabouts are in an irregular situation and it seems 
difficult to influence them to teach regularly, just as it is difficult to refuse them permission if 
they ask for it.”42 The policy of registration was intended to regulate schools. Permission to open 
a school was intended to be dependent upon a teacher's ability to offer an Islamic education and 
the safety of the school structure. However, colonial reports stated that the government was 
unable to decline a school permission to open because the status and quality of Quranic schools, 
teachers, and programs across the Upper Volta varied. This variability caused a standard quality 
to be difficult to locate and the colonial authorities granted permission for all schools to open, so 
long as the marabout correctly applied and respected colonial policies such as tax payments. The 
history of the status of Islamic educational institutions across the Upper Volta before the 
establishment of the Communauté indicates the difficulty for colonial authorities to establish 
formal control over these proliferating institutions. Additionally, this history of the plurality of 
Islamic beliefs and practices leading to the establishment of a variety of Muslim educational 
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institutions offers insight into the difficulties of regulating and gathering a consensus for the 
promotion of a national Franco-Arab education. 
 
Beginning in the 1950s, some of the Muslim sects in the Upper Volta hoped to expand 
the Islamic education currently available from Quranic schools to an education that included 
French, Arabic and Quranic studies. This aspiration became a central point of discussion at 
meetings of the Communauté. A French education was deemed important for two reasons. First, 
government policies did not recognize Quranic schools as educational establishments because 
they did not offer a French education. This meant that Muslim schools did not benefit from the 
same tax benefits as Catholic schools. In a letter entitled, “On the Subject of the Abuses of the 
Catholic Mission of Ouagadougou” to the Governor General, the Inspector of Administrative 
Affairs highlighted that the Catholic mission benefitted from special tax breaks, military services 
and benefits. He concluded with the observation that the mission “has managed to create a 
privileged class of a few thousand Catholics who tyrannize the rest of the population.”43 Stable 
employment positions were rare as only .5 percent of the population held formal employment 
positions and Voltaic Catholics occupied the majority of these positions.44 This employment 
advantage of Catholics over the majority of the population generated demand from Muslims for 
an education that was oriented at both Islamic teachings as well as teaching the French 
curriculum and technical skills. In this context, Subbanu and Tijaniyya Islamic sects agreed on 
the need to offer a new religious education. However, their differing religious practices shaped 
their divergent opinions on the appropriate educational curriculum and their failure to reach a 
consensus to co-create such a program.  
 
 The joint support from the Subbanu movement and the Tijaniyya for a reformed Islamic 
education was initially informed by a Senegalese based, Pan-African association, the Union 
Culturelle Musulmane (UCM). UCM ideology was influential in forming local perceptions of a 
reformed Islamic education for two diverging Islamic sects. The UCM was established in Dakar, 
Senegal by Cheikh Fass Touré in 1953 who studied under Serigne Hady Toure, a celebrated 
follower of a Tijaniyya branch of Islam in Senegal. Following his studies in Senegal, Cheikh 
Fass spent a short period of time at the Institute of Islamic Studies in Boutlimit Mauritania where 
he obtained a degree in Franco-Arab studies. At this time, Boutlimit was the only Islamic 
educational institution in the AOF where students could pass an exam at the end of their 
studies.45 He returned to Senegal with the desire to create more opportunities for Franco-Arab 
schooling. These efforts were met with resistance from the colonial government which 
proclaimed there was “no need for the teaching of the Arabic language”46 on a wide-scale.  This 
fueled resentment toward the colonial administration for quenching Arabic education while 
supporting Christian schooling. The French colonial policies towards Quranic schools directed 
the formal efforts of the leaders of the UCM to establish Franco-Arab educational institutions 
across the colonies.  
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In the late 1950s, UCM leaders traveled across the AOF to preach on the purification of 
Islam, the need to form a new Islamic education based on Arabic literacy and to critique the 
French colonial administration for destroying Quranic schools while supporting Catholic 
schools. The goal of the UCM became forming a new madrasa education that included setting up 
libraries, managing schools, collecting funds for student assistance and using ‘modern pedagogy’ 
such as conferences, artistic events, film screenings and camping for the education of students. 
Additionally, the association aimed to purify Islam from practices that were against the Quran 
yet common in the Upper Volta, such as the continued use of fetishes and consumption of 
alcohol and pork. Finally, the movement sought to motivate Muslims to improve their economic 
conditions. By 1960, over fifteen UCM branches were registered with the French government 
throughout the Upper Volta, the first of which was established in Bobo-Dioulasso.47 Throughout 
the AOF, the UCM was presumed to be an anti-Tijaniyya movement because leaders of the 
UCM denounced the worshipping of specific religious leaders and the celebration of the Prophet 
Muhammed. In the Upper Volta the head of the Hamawiyya-Tijaniyya branch in Ramtoulaye 
established a UCM office in Ouahigouya in 1958.48 In the Upper Volta, religious leaders were 
able to reconcile conflicting beliefs and practices in order to support a political and religious, 
pan-African movement and their overarching desire to reform the Islamic educational 
experience. The effort of the UCM was never realized because following independence, each 
West African nation created independent national Muslim associations. The history of the 
UCM's efforts to reform and unify Islamic education during the French colonial era directed the 
Communauté's vision to establish a unified network of Franco-Arab institutions. This history 
demonstrates that the prior legacies of these institutions informs how educations are envisioned 
and desired throughout West Africa and by local Voltaic communities. 
 
Simultaneous to developments for a concerted effort to reform the Islamic education and 
teach both Arabic and French, some of the early Muslim converts were staunchly opposed to 
teaching Arabic. They deemed knowledge of Arabic unnecessary for Islamic expression, 
indicating a divergence of opinions on the necessary religious education and the inconsistent 
responses to a Franco-Arab education dependent on religious beliefs and practices. For some 
Sufi Muslims, Arabic was associated with Middle Eastern Islam and was deemed a foreign 
practice. Hampate Ba, a respected Malian diplomat and author, was a leader of this group. He 
identified Islam in West Africa as “black Islam” and labeled its practices as fundamentally 
different from Arab Islam. The difference, according to Ba, is based on the integration of 
traditional rituals that are not delineated in the Quran, into West African religious practices. A 
proponent of Sufi Islam and a student under a Tijaniyya spiritual leader, Ba argued that the 
introduction of Arabic would deteriorate the local cultural heritage whose richness and 
sophistication he wished to preserve.49  
 
This opposition to the teaching of Arabic was different from the Subbanu who 
emphasized the language's importance to religious expression. As explained previously, the 
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leaders of the Subbanu movement sought to rid Islam from practices that were not endorsed by 
the Quran. They believed that a reading of the text in Arabic was a primary method for this 
cleansing. However, the vast majority of Muslims throughout Upper Volta, including the early 
converts and the Tijaniyya, continued to integrate these practices alongside Islamic rituals. They 
preferred an education in French in order to attain formal employment alongside of a basic 
Quranic education. These diverging opinions on how to institute a religious education were 
informed by diverse religious traditions in the Upper Volta and were all represented by the 
Communauté.   
 
Establishment of the Communauté 
Muslim leaders from across the Upper Volta, with multiple religious ideologies and 
conflicting viewpoints over how Islam should be taught and practiced gathered at the 
Communauté’s first meetings. These leaders agreed to establish a singular Muslim voice in 
opposition to the newly independent secular state. Additionally, they agreed on the need to 
change the status of Islamic education in the country. However, within the first decade of the 
Communauté’s establishment, the implementation of these goals was hindered because of the 
conflicts that arose within the community in attempts to form unity. The resultant breakup of the 
Communauté indicates that the divergent Islamic beliefs makes problematic the implementation 
of a singular religious, educational curriculum.  
 
The Communauté was established from the Ouagadougou branch of the UCM in 1962.  
At the association’s first annual meetings, representatives from every region of the Upper Volta 
and over 100 communities were present. A constitution was ratified with a list of articles to 
outline the association’s apolitical goals, organizational structure and leadership. The primary 
aims were stated as follows: "to safeguard the religious interests of Muslims, to rid Islam of all 
harmful influences and practices of corruption, to fight by appropriate means the superstitions 
and exploitation of the credibility of the faithful."50 The main activities of the organization were 
meant to be educational, cultural and religious. However, in practice, it quickly became apparent 
that there were multiple voices of the Muslim community, each representing differing religious 
beliefs and practices. At these first meetings, the various Islamic sects fought over who could 
serve as the Imam (or religious leader), and how the Quran should be read and taught, resulting 
in a splintering of the community and the establishment of numerous Islamic associations.  
 
At the first meeting of the Communauté, there was disagreement over who was to be 
appointed the association’s great Imam. These disputes were the first clear indication of division 
in the Muslim community. Initially, leaders of the Communauté assumed that the Imam of the 
Mossi Kingdom, selected by the Mogho-Naba (the Mossi king) and the prayer leader for the 
Grand Mosque of Ouagadougou, would become the association’s Imam. However, this decision 
sparked conflict between the early Sufi Muslim converts who were considered traditionalists and 
the Subbanu leaders who were joined by a group of Muslims who were repatriated from Mecca 
after having spent years in Saudi Arabia, unable to afford the voyage home. The key 
disagreement between the groups was over a Mossi ritual swearing in the head Imam. The Imam 
was required to sip a local drink, Tibo, from a calabash while uttering the words: "I will never 
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betray the Mogho-Naba in whatever circumstance it is, I will come to his aid in case of war with 
the enemy, I will execute without discussion but orders that I will receive from my King.”51 
According to the reformers and Subbanu leaders, this proclamation is not in line with Islamic 
Law and was unfaithful to Islam. The association’s President, El Hadji Ousmane Sibiri, was able 
to convince reformers to accept the imam on the basis of his old age, therefore implying that they 
would soon have the opportunity to elect a new imam.52 The differing beliefs of Voltaic Muslims 
on the saliency of Mossi rituals in accordance with Islam led to diverging opinions on the 
Communauté’s leadership and instigated future divisions within the Muslim community.  
 
At the Second General Assembly, conflicts continued between community members over 
the selection of a new President and Imam. On May 2nd 1966, the great Imam, El Hadji Mahama 
Baguian passed away, followed by the association’s President El Hadji Ousmane Sibiri in 
December.  The decision of who would become the association’s imam was a point of contention 
and required much deliberation among community members. El Hadji Ousmane, the first 
President of the Communauté, was respected by all members of the Muslim community because 
of his reputation as a prominent trader from Bobo, a financier of the grand Mosque of 
Ouagadougou and supporter of Islamic and French education. He was also well liked by 
government officials because of his ability to settle disputes within the Muslim community. A 
replacement Imam was chosen by the Mogho-Naba. The Subbanu refused to follow the Mogho-
Naba’s choice and appointed Al Hajj Abdoul Salam Tiemtore as the great imam. The early 
Mossi converts within the Communauté rejected the Subbanu's selection because he was not 
recognized by the Mogho-Naba, therefore should not be the imam for the Communauté. This 
conflict solidified a split within the Communauté not just over religious doctrines, but also 
between members who would continue to support the Mohgo-Naba against those who wanted to 
break away from this older system of authority.  
 
Attempts to form national Islamic schooling  
Expanding French literacy and knowledge was a priority for both the Communauté and 
the Voltaic government in 1960. At the time, the country had one of the world’s lowest literacy 
rates at 6.6 percent.53 Regulatory policies of Quranic schools were carried over from the colonial 
administration. While the state granted permission to establish these schools, Maurice 
Yameogo’s administration did not want to intervene in these institutions or in the conflicts that 
ensued because of the assumption that interference would suggest the state’s religious allegiance. 
The state offered support by registering these schools, without investigation of the school’s 
curriculum, leadership or infrastructures. The Communauté sought to fulfill the role to create a 
uniform educational curriculum, training teachers and visiting schools to guarantee a national 
standard of education. 
 
While working towards agreement on an Islamic educational curriculum, the 
Communauté intervened in disagreements over the establishment of a new Quranic school in 
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Bobo. Diverging religious traditions within the Communauté’s leadership became apparent and 
shaped their opinion on the establishment of this new Bobolese school. In order to understand the 
basis of this conflict, a brief history of the creation of religious institutions in Bobo is necessary. 
Bobo’s first mosque was built by a wealthy Dyula Muslim in 1857 in the Farakan district of the 
city. As the Muslim community expanded, the mosque became too small to hold Friday prayers. 
In 1897, a marabout, Sakidi Sanou, returned from studying in Mali and decided to construct a 
new, Grand Mosque.54 The selected location was occupied by sacred wood that was worshiped 
by local Bobo fetishers. This caused violent conflicts while the mosque was under construction 
as the local population were angered by the destruction of their sacred site.  
 
Conflicts continued throughout the early 1900s, with Bobolese natives and Malian 
foreign members of the Subbanu both killed in August 1941. After the death of the new 
mosque’s initial founders and imams, Sanou Salia was selected to become the new Imam. 
However, his appointment sparked disputes within the local Muslim community that was largely 
anti-French and against Sanou Salia, who politically aligned with the colonial administration. 
Local authorities refused the request of the local Bobolese population to remove Sanou from the 
position of Imam based on their statement that he lacked Koranic knowledge. This incident 
angered the local population and Bobolese natives held a ‘family council’ which resulted in their 
decision to stop attending prayer at the grand mosque because of Sanou’s position as the imam. 
From this time on, hostility between the two groups, the Bobolese natives and the Subbanu 
foreigners, deepened. So much so that the colonial administration thought it useful to have the 
mosque monitored by the police on Friday prayers in order to prevent possible incidents.55 
French authorities hoped that the construction of another mosque would dispel tension and 
granted permission for a new mosque to be built by the Subbanu leaders in the city’s Hamdallaye 
district in 1949. Additionally, a new school was attached to the mosque to hold 300 students and 
offered instruction in both Arabic and French. This mosque and school obtained financial 
support and praise from Malian, Ghanaian and Guinean visitors. The Hamdallaye mosque 
gathered followers locally because of the mosque’s newer appearance and the large, formal 
school attached. However, it also deepened divisions within the Muslim community in Bobo as 
the Subbanu foreigners launched campaigns that denigrated the old mosque and the prayer rituals 
and Muslim teachings practiced there, saying they were not in accordance with Islam.  
 
 These conflicts were brought to the attention of the UCM in Bobo and became central to 
discussions over Islamic education during the first meetings of the Communauté. The 
disagreements over the school’s establishment indicates how the dynamic religious beliefs and 
practices throughout country informed differing opinions on the religious education and 
problematized the execution of a unified educational curriculum. A meeting was held by local 
Bobolese government and school officials on the 12th of January 1960. The school’s leader, El 
Hadj Bengali Diana, thanked the city council and the government for approving the school’s 
construction. Simultaneously, he offhandedly reprimanded the negative attitude of the local 
director of education, Dienepo Ibrahim, for having denounced the newly established school that 
offered an education in Arabic literacy and the Quran. Government reports on this meeting stated 
that Ibrahim defamed these schools because they competed with Quranic schools that he 
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managed.56 Additionally, the new school was supported by the Subbanu foreigners, while 
Ibrahim was affiliated with the local Bobolese Muslim population. Nationally, the state 
responded to these disputes by emphasizing the need for the schools to be open to all interested 
individuals.57 However, ongoing conflicts in and around Bobo indicated that differing viewpoints 
on the structure of an Islamic education are informed by diverse religious traditions and 
complicates assembling a consensus for a unified educational curriculum.  
 
Communauté’s vision for Islamic education reform 
The Communauté largely agreed on the need to redefine the country's Islamic schools 
from only Quranic to Franco-Arab schooling. They envisioned an education in French and 
professional skills as well as a comprehensive Arabic and religious education. Due to conflicts 
within the Communauté including over the instruction of religious beliefs and practices, the 
association’s vision for a unified Islamic education was never realized. The program structure 
promoted by the Communauté is similar to PREFA’s program with a national curriculum, French 
and Arabic teachings, and a streamlined process to enter public schooling. The Communauté 
asked for government support for this program in the 1960s. However, they failed to gather 
government support and a consensus from members for the institution of this education. 
 
Communauté members agreed to work together to form new teaching establishments 
where religious education was general and given in a ‘rational’ manner, by which they meant an 
education in both Islam and a modern education with the standard French curriculum.58 They 
hoped that students who obtained a diploma from a Franco-Arab school would be able to achieve 
the same level of employment as a student from a state school. In order to do this, the members 
asserted that French as well as Arabic was essential to the education of Muslims. However, the 
Communauté members acknowledged that the lack of personnel and French speaking teachers 
made this final requirement impossible to fulfill. In a speech delivered to the Second General 
Assembly of the Communauté, the President of the Commission of Education, El Hadj 
Souleymane Konate, directly addressed the government and asked for support from the 
administration in order to provide this French education. A confidential report was written by a 
government representative at this meeting, outlining the association's request for support of these 
schools.59 However, this bid was never fulfilled because assisting these schools was not deemed 
a priority by the low-income state.60 The first active effort by the Burkinabe government to 
provide support for schools with an Arabic and French curriculum was not until PREFA in 2014. 
  
 Another of the Communauté’s goals was for these new Franco-Arab schools to have a 
unified program and educational curriculum. This would guarantee that students across the 
country had equal access to education. El Hadj Souleymane Konate requested that students who 
                                               
56 Letter to the Ministry of interior entitled ’Sur la reunion de l’Union Culturelle Musulmane de Bobo- Diallasso', 12 
Jan 1960, 3h1a, Burkina Faso National Archives, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. 
57 Letter to the Ministry of Interior, 4 June 1960, 3h1a, Burkina Faso National Archives, Ouagadougo, Burkina 
Faso.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Confidential report on the Congress of the Communauté Musulmane, 22 Dec 1964, 7v483, Burkina Faso National 
Archives, Ouagadougo, Burkina Faso. 
60 Hatime Deme (Assistant Director of PREFA), interviewed by Janet Smith at Islamic University of Burkina Faso, 
31 May 2017.   
24 
 
graduated from the Franco-Arab schools obtain a certificate of ‘Etudes Primaries Arabes' to 
formally acknowledge that these students obtained the same education. Additionally, the 
formality of a national curriculum would permit the best students to continue on to secondary 
and superior studies. A current professor, N’Diaye Diawara was appointed the authority to 
inspect all of the country’s Islamic schools, ensuring a uniform cost of inscription and program 
management. However, the conflicts amongst Muslim factions in the Upper Volta over the 
Communauté 's leadership stalled these projects from becoming implemented. After 1964, the 
association’s focus shifted towards resolving disagreements within the Communauté over 
leadership, the specificities of the national education program and ongoing conflicts in places 
like Bobo. The leaders did not meet again until 1972 when divisions within the Muslim 
population were already crystallized and the Tijanniya had left the Communauté.  
 
Tijanniya members promoted the inclusion of teachings on Prophets after Muhammed 
and particular gestures during prayer that were rejected by the majority of the Communauté. This 
division was evident at the Second General Assembly and the Tijanniya left the Communauté 
shortly thereafter and hindered the Communauté from gathering a consensus for a unified 
Islamic education. The early Tijanniya members of the association aspired to include an 
education of these spiritual leaders in the curriculum, which was at odds with the majority of the 
Communauté. At the second general assembly, a community leader pointedly criticized 
Tijanniya practices stating: “We solemnly warn, many of our confreres, who are still being 
duped by certain foreigners who pretend to be direct descendants of the Prophet's grandsons […] 
because this is the reason for your coming to this great Assembly, we criticize, objectively. It is 
at this price alone that our Organization will go, progressing.”61 In this statement, the 
Communaute leader directly stated that the teachings of the Tijanniya are improper versions of 
Islam that are hindering the organization from progressing. Boubacar Sawadogo, the leader of 
the largest Tijanniya branch called the Hamawiyya, and other leaders of northern Tijanniya 
movements rejected the support of talibe, or Quranic students who beg for food and money that 
is given to their marabout teacher. Other members of the Communauté endorsed this practice, 
saying that if the talibe are nourished by what they receive from begging, they will see all of this 
food as from Islam and become grateful.62 These differing beliefs over the support of talibe and 
the worshiping of prophets complicated the implementation of a unified educational curriculum 
across these diverging religious traditions.  
 
 The lack of funding for a Franco-Arab education directly impacted the activities of 
Communauté members. After demands for a reform of Quranic education were sent to the 
Voltaic administration, government officials responded by stating that they lacked funds to 
support these schools and there were not enough trained French educators to send teachers to 
these schools. Additionally, Yameogo’s administration was fearful that involvement in this 
Islamic education would hurt Upper Volta’s reputation as a secular state. Instead, the 
Communauté and local community leaders were forced to rely on their own networks for support 
for Franco-Arab and Quranic schools. Throughout the 1960s, financial support was collected 
locally for schools. Funds were obtained through donations from local community members and 
small school fees. However, Communauté leaders also sought international support, voiced in a 
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speech by the President of the Commission of Education, El Hadj Souleymane Konate at the 
1964 General Assembly on the financial status of the community that ended with the statement: 
“It is desirable that we try to build relationships that will benefit us with Muslim brothers from 
outside, especially Arab countries.”63 In 1965, the Communauté received small donations such as 
books from the Saudi Arabian embassy in Ghana that were intended to improve Arabic.64 Larger 
donations of over fifty million CFA were provided by the Algerian government for the 
construction of a Franco-Arab school and a madrasa in 1968. Four years later, the Libyan 
government contributed forty-eight million CFA for the construction of a Central Mosque in 
Ouagadougou.65 The amount and form of aid to the Communauté shifted after the oil crisis of the 
1970s. As larger sums of money were sent to the Upper Volta, Franco-Arab schools and 
religious activities in the country became organized around formal associations while 
government policies shifted to appease these donors in order to tap into this wealth.  
 
With the dramatic increase in oil prices in the 1970s, the wealth of the Gulf states 
allowed newly affluent Middle Eastern donors in countries like Saudi Arabia to provide 
substantial international donations. The onset of the Sahelian drought drew attention to the 
region’s need for international aid and assistance. The Voltaic government was dependent on 
external donations for the government to function and local communities were dependent on 
food aid and social support services from non-profit organizations and government 
organizations. Additionally, Sangoulé Lamizana revoked the previous President’s diplomatic 
relations with Israel, opening the country up for support from Arab organizations. In 1975, 
Upper Volta joined the organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Muslim World League and 
the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY).66 Arab philanthropists sent funds to the 
leaders of the main Islamic associations, first the Communauté, but also leaders of the Subbanu 
movement. These funds were used to build mosques, schools and provide for the basic needs of 
communities during the Sahelian drought. However, the increase of funds to leaders of the 
Tijanniya, Subbanu and Communauté leaders solidified divisions between the already disputing 
Islamic sects as leaders competed among themselves for limited funds.67  
 
As the population of practicing Muslims in the Upper Volta continued to grow, the 
demand for mosques and Franco-Arab and Quranic schools grew as well. Additionally, a school 
building made with mud and without tables and chairs was no longer desirable, raising the cost 
of a school’s construction and maintenance. Disputes between these groups reached a climax 
after a polemic sermon from a Subbanu leader denounced local rituals that blended Islamic 
practices and local traditions at the Grand Mosque in Ouagadougou. The sermon provoked an 
argument over whether or not the Subbanu foreigners could attend the mosque for Friday prayer. 
This dispute resulted in violence and required the police to step in to stop the conflict.68 
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Following this event, the Subbanu leader, Muhammad Malick Sana, realized that he needed 
police protection in case of another conflict. Additionally, Sana and his followers were 
determined to establish a mosque of their own, thus requiring permission from the state to 
register as an association69 and formalizing Islamic practices as Muslim communities became 
organized into government recognized structures. In 1973, Sana and his followers established a 
formal religious association entitled ‘Mouvement Sunnite de Haute Volta.’70 It is with the 
establishment of the Mouvement Sunnite that the Muslim community of the Upper Volta was 
officially divided as leaders of disputing Muslim factions no longer gathered on a unified 
platform and the goal to create a unified network of schools elapsed.  
 
Summary and Discussion 
 The history of the Communauté Musulmane offered in this paper contributes to a body of 
literature within development studies that seeks to analyze religious categories as dynamic and to 
revisit the relationship between religion, society and politics.71 Through a case study analysis of 
the shifting visions for Islamic education in Burkina Faso, I investigate how religious practices 
and national educational objectives shift in relation to each other. The long historical review and 
the critical analysis attempted here can expand existing literature with insights for scholars and 
development practitioners. For scholars, the review clearly underscores the highly dynamic and 
interactive relations between educational and religious institutions, as both contribute to national 
development objectives. For development practitioners and especially those attempting deep 
educational reforms such as envisioned in PREFA, my analysis questions the assumptions of 
religious unity and cultural consensus that often undergird these efforts.  
 
 Since the association's establishment, Communauté leaders disagreed over the integration 
of local traditions into the association's structure. These practices, such as worshiping prophets 
after Mohammed, the consumption of pork and alcohol and the appointment of the head Imam 
by the Mossi king, established clear divisions between members. These rifts were deepened after 
leaders of contending religious sects fought over the Communauté's leadership and funding. The 
history offered in this paper outlined how these dynamic religious beliefs and practices 
throughout the country informed diverging opinions by Communauté members on the structure 
of a religious education. While these members agreed on the need to reform the status of Islamic 
education in the Upper Volta, the execution was problematized by these differing religious 
practices that informed various visions for a model Islamic education and the Communauté 
splintered. 
 
Following the Communauté's break, the association retained their role as the formal 
representative platform for Burkina Faso's Muslim communities, even though the association no 
longer met across all of the country's religious traditions. Their dominance weakened over time 
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as more associations were established. During the 1990s, clashes between the Communauté and 
the Mouvement Sunnite over the control of mosques and urban spaces became violent, 
particularly in Ouagadougou. Smaller associations with objectives related to Islam were 
established throughout the country and by the end of the century, the number of Islamic 
associations rose to over 100. Today, there are over 250 Islamic associations in Burkina Faso and 
approximately thirty Islamic NGOs registered with the government. All Islamic NGOs work in 
education in some capacity, providing school supplies, paying teacher salaries and pupil fees or 
constructing Franco-Arab, Quranic and Madrasa school infrastructures. Three of these NGOs are 
international, with headquarters based in the Middle East. They all construct and frequently 
regulate Quranic and Franco-Arab schools, stipulating their own sets of objectives and 
educational visions. 
 
 Academic scholars exploring the nexus of religion and development can learn from the 
history of the Communauté's and the contemporary international efforts to reform Islamic 
educations in Burkina Faso. First, the Communauté's struggle to unify and inability to represent 
the nation's Muslim population indicates that gathering a consensus amongst religiously like-
minded individuals is difficult. This dynamism issues caution to scholars who assume that 
groups or projects that identify with the same religion are better positioned than secular or 
religiously different organizations to offer development assistance to affiliate members.  
 
 Second, the history of the Communauté demonstrates that visions for an Islamic 
education changed after the Upper Volta’s independence and was different according to 
individual religious beliefs. This underscores the importance of research that revisits the ongoing 
relationship between religion and national development projects. The implementation of PREFA 
today indicates that the government has changed their legal classification of an education to 
include Franco-Arab institutions after the local expansion of these schools and global attention to 
their need to reform. The Communauté also changed their vision for an Islamic education 
because of the Voltaic Catholic education and a desire for a French and Arabic education. Since 
the early 2000s, religion has been considered important to development. However, the key shifts 
in Islamic education in Burkina Faso indicate that both religious and development practices are 
shaped in relation to one another. To better understand the nexus of religion and development, 
the conditions under which religions and religious associations became valuable to improvement 
programs deserves further scholarly attention to ensure that the needs of project recipients, rather 
than donors and international actors, is being met. 
 
Lastly, in employing this critical and historical approach to studies of religion and 
development, scholars can offer key insight to ongoing development projects and programs. 
PREFA’s objective to standardize Franco-Arab education was similarly attempted by the 
Communauté, yet this history is unacknowledged by the current programs. The Communauté 
member's differing religious traditions shaped their diverging educational preferences and 
provoked conflicts when selecting a singular curriculum. From the case study of the 
Communauté, scholars and development practitioners are warned of the difficulties in using 
education reform as the mechanism through which to deliver religious teachings. In order for 
PREFA or Islamic educational reform programs to be successfully adopted across the country’s 
diverse religious communities, the history of each school and religious community needs to be 
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taken into consideration. I recommend that the educational curriculum, while standardized, allow 
for local flexibility so as to accommodate religious pluralism.   
 
